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ABSTRACT 
Amanda Sophia Ashley: Authoritarian Preference and Locus of Control in Russia 
(Under the direction of Jonathan Weiler) 
 
 
Political preferences and behavior are rooted in psychological traits. Locus of control theory 
describes in terms of internality or externality whether individuals believe they exercise a lot of influence 
over events in their lives, or whether they attribute such events to outside forces such as luck, fate, or 
some authority. I applied this theory to political science to explore whether this construct can predict 
authoritarian preference. I focused on Russia and hypothesized that Russians may be more predisposed 
toward an external locus of control and preference for authoritarianism than are citizens of liberal 
democracies. I use Pew Research Center’s Spring 2011 Survey data to test effects of locus of control on 
authoritarian preference, controlling for country and for economic strength preference. Preference for a 
strong economy most strongly correlates with preference for a strong-hand leader, but I also find a 
significant effect of locus of control and country on authoritarian preference. 
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Authoritarian Preference and Locus of Control in Russia 
The intersection between psychology and political science is a well-traveled one, yet one that 
finds itself consistently in need of more attention in order to understand political attitudes and behaviors. 
When we peel away at the political behavior of elites, political parties, and voters, what is left at the core 
is mental processes. When voters form their opinions about a particular issue and who best represents 
their interests, they draw from an understanding of the world informed by their own experiences, values, 
religious beliefs, personality traits, and so forth. The schemas individuals use to interpret the world and 
people around them influence how they perceive and feel about that world. Recent spikes in right-wing 
authoritarianism in the West and elsewhere provide a new opportunity to question how the field of 
psychology might explain authoritarian preference (“Rise of ‘Authoritarian Populism’”, 2017). Rather 
than view authoritarianism as something primarily imposed from the top-down, I argue for a less popular 
view, that authoritarianism is actually co-constructed and is as much supported from the bottom-up 
phenomena as it is imposed from the top-down. I suggest that preference for authoritarian or 
nonauthoritarian governance is intrinsically rooted in the human psyche, just as is any perspective or 
preference. One important psychological concept that represents how an individual interprets and 
understands events in their life and the world around them is that of locus of control.  
This concept, first defined in 1966 in a psychological study on reinforcements, describes how 
individuals interpret the world in terms of how much control they believe they exercise over it (Rotter, 
1966). Those who believe they have a strong degree of influence over events in their lives have an 
internal locus of control, while those who attribute events to forces beyond their control – be it fate, luck, 
chance, or a higher authority – have an external locus of control. The way Russians have often been 
described as fatalistic might effectively describe the ultimate external locus of control. Stereotypes of 
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Russians are frequently characterized by a perception of the Russian people as apathetic or seemingly 
indifferent in the face of tragedy, disaster or political circumstances (Meyers, 2007). Is there any truth to 
such a fatalism (conceptualized here as an external locus of control) existing in Russia today? If it does 
exist, to what extent is it unique to Russia and to what extent should we expect to find a similar “fatalism” 
in other former Soviet States or certain types of cultures? Asking such questions allows us to think more 
deeply about the nature, creation, and reinforcement of psychological traits across cultures and nations.  
Under the assumption that authoritarianism is co-constructed, how might external locus of control in 
Russia (and elsewhere) mediate preference for authoritarian governance as seen in continuous popular 
support of leaders like Vladimir Putin? Can locus of control help to explain why some people prefer a 
strongman authoritarian leader while others prefer a more liberal alternative? 
According to locus of control theory, an individual who believes his or her actions can influence 
outcomes is more likely to act upon his environment. Applying this theory to political science, I use data 
from the Spring 2011 Nations Survey conducted by Pew Research Center, to address a twofold 
hypothesis. The first is whether, in a comparison of individuals, those having a more external locus of 
control will be more likely to prefer authoritarian governance than those having a less external locus of 
control. The logic behind this hypothesis is founded in locus of control theory’s main assertion, that those 
with a more internal orientation are more likely to act upon their environment. Thus, in terms of political 
participation, someone who attributes events to external forces such as fate, luck, or chance, should 
logically place less importance on political participation and thus value democratic processes less. 
Likewise, it is logical that someone who believes he or she has a great deal of influence over events in 
their life would place greater value on political participation, believing they really can make a difference 
in their world. Thus, someone with an internal locus of control ought to reasonably prefer more 
democratic governance, while someone with an external locus of control might reasonably prefer more 
authoritarian governance.  
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The second part of my hypothesis is designed to address the idea of Russian fatalism. I 
hypothesize that, compared to residents of Western democracies such as the United States, Russians will 
tend to have a more external locus of control. In addressing this hypothesis, I test whether Russians, in 
general, are more fatalistic than citizens of other countries by controlling for country. Research has shown 
that individuals in collectivist societies like Russia and China tend to have a more external locus of 
control than do individuals in more individualistic societies like the United States (Cheng, et al., 2013; 
Smith, et al., 1995). Whether or not there exists some uniquely Russian “fatalism”, there is reason to 
suspect that a more collectivist culture like that found in Russia will score relatively higher on a measure 
of external locus of control than will more individualistic cultures. In addressing this hypothesis, I draw 
attention to important questions about cultural traits and generalizations, and to what extent patterns of 
behavior are really unique to a certain group.  
On a larger scale, I am questioning whether we might be able to predict the survival and 
persistence of authoritarian regimes once they are in place based on how the majority of the population is 
oriented on a locus of control scale. My emphasis highlights the agency of citizens in the maintenance and 
persistence of authoritarian regimes once they are in power. I do not argue that citizens at large are 
responsible for the initial establishment and consolidation of authoritarian power, but rather that their 
choices not to protest or to prefer authoritarian stability to perceived risky alternatives directly contributes 
to the persistence and survival of authoritarian regimes. To be sure, many other variables influence each 
individual’s political attitudes and behavior as well. However, locus of control is arguably central to all 
variables in that it theorizes about when some peoples’ beliefs will translate into action and why others’ 
will not.. While individuals may be highly motivated to vote or to prefer an alternative to authoritarian 
leadership for any number of reasons, are motivation and preferences negated by a belief that one cannot 
control the world around them? Precisely because locus of control has never been explored in this 
context, it is important that we ask these questions.  
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As the present research seeks to answer questions about locus of control and political preference, 
it is important to acknowledge that all personality traits and political attitudes exist not in a vacuum but 
within a particular context. A certain personality trait may behave differently in different settings. Thus, 
after first discussing important literature from the field of psychology, I then outline the developments 
over the last three decades in Russia with an eye toward protests and political activism, and how historical 
events have shaped the existing context, both politically and psychologically. I then briefly discuss what I 
mean by authoritarianism and make some important distinctions between authoritarian personality and 
authoritarian governance. I build off existing theories and add to them by placing my research within the 
context of Russia. I then use variables from the Spring 2011 Nations Survey dataset to conduct statistical 
analysis of the relationships and significance between locus of control and authoritarian preference, 
controlling for country. Lastly, I end with a discussion of the limitations of the present study and avenues 
for future research.    
Why Locus of Control? 
Locus of control offers a way of conceptualizing and measuring individuals’ perceptions of the 
causes of outcomes. It differentiates between levels of perceived control among individuals. Locus of 
control theory suggests that an individual who believes his or her actions can influence outcomes is more 
likely to act upon his environment. The psychological concept of “locus of control” originally developed 
out of social learning theory by Julian Rotter in 1954, and in the course of his research on expectancies 
and reinforcements, Rotter defined the concept of locus of control as follows: 
When a reinforcement is perceived by the subject . . . as the result of luck, chance, fate, as 
under the control of powerful others, or as unpredictable because of the great complexity 
of the forces surrounding him . . . we have labeled this a belief in external control. If the 
person perceives that the event is contingent upon his own behavior or his own relatively 
permanent characteristics, we have termed this a belief in internal control (Rotter, 1966). 
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Moreover, Rotter derived important behavioral correlates from the construct. He discovered that an 
individual who views outcome as a result not of his or her own efforts, but of fate, chance, luck, or 
influence by powerful others is likely to refrain from seeking to influence his or her environment.  
Where does locus of control come from? In short, the development of locus of control is a 
product of nurture rather than nature. It is associated with family style and resources, cultural factors, 
stability, and experiences with effort leading to reward (Meyerhoff, 2004). As developmental psychology 
understands it, most individuals with an internal locus of control were raised in homes that modeled 
typical internal beliefs; for example, emphasizing effort, education, and personal responsibility and 
thinking. Parents who typically give their children rewards they promise them are enforcing an internal 
locus of control. By contrast, individuals with an external locus of control tend to come from lower 
socioeconomic backgrounds and did not consistently receive rewards promised them (Cohen et al., 2001; 
Meyerhoff, 2004). Research also shows that societies experiencing social unrest have an increased 
expectancy of events being out-of-control, and thus people in such societies become more external in their 
orientation (Meyerhoff, 2004). In effect, locus of control is a product of family life and culture, and is 
linked to the degree of stability and validation of reward expectancies one receives at a young age. The 
dominant view in psychology is that locus of control is one of several core personality traits which remain 
consistent over time (Judge, et al, 1997).  
In the wake of Rotter’s study, locus of control was used to explain a broad array of behaviors, 
from the field of personality psychology to health psychology, social, and clinical psychology. Locus of 
control helps explain a host of issues, ranging from personality dimensions and traits such as dogmatism 
and levels of aspiration, to behaviors such as risk-taking behaviors and interpersonal reciprocity (Clouser 
& Hjelle, 1970; Milgram, 1970). Whether or not individuals attribute causes internally or externally 
predicts a host of behaviors from family life to politics, but has been especially applicable to health 
psychology. One study on risk-taking behaviors examined whether or not safe-sex practices correlated to 
an internal or external locus of control. As we might expect, their research shows that individuals with 
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more external orientations are less likely to practice birth control than are their more internally oriented 
counterparts (MacDonald, 1970). The reason is that those who attribute outcome to personal action are 
more likely to behave responsibly – that is, those with more internal orientations are more likely to take 
fewer risks.   
While less research has extended Rotter’s concept of locus of control into other fields, there exists 
a broad array of literature linking locus of control with political science.  For example, voting behavior, 
opinions about global warming, and anti-immigrant sentiment have been studied using locus of control 
(Harell & Iyengar, 2016; Mostafa, 2016). One of the earliest applications of locus of control to political 
science sought to explain why black voters and voters of lower socio-economic status were less likely to 
vote, even though they had fought rigorously for suffrage and were arguably more motivated to do so. 
Research showed that while education, age, and other factors were important predictors, whether or not 
voters had an external locus of control was the best predictor of voter turnout (Majete, 1987). Other 
studies suggest those with an internal locus of control are more likely to have higher socioeconomic 
status, are more likely to be politically involved (e.g., following political news, joining a political 
organizations, etc.) (Cohen et al, 2001), and are more likely to vote (Blanchard & Scarboro, 1973; 
Deutchman, 1985). In addition, cross-national studies of locus of control show that individuals in 
collectivist societies tend to have a more external locus of control than do individuals in more 
individualistic societies like the United States.  This suggests that citizens in more collectivist countries 
like Russia will tend more toward an external locus of control, whereas citizens of Western nations will 
tend to have more internal orientations of locus of control. Such studies are important examples of how 
the construct of locus of control is behaviorally far-reaching and does indeed have important implications 
for the political world. 
Given the predictive value of locus of control for political attitudes, it is perhaps surprising that 
there is not more literature specifically on regime-type preference and locus of control. While there are a 
host of factors that undoubtedly work together to explain why individuals in Russia continue to prefer 
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authoritarian government, locus of control is both neglected in this sphere and particularly useful. It is 
especially useful for explaining political preferences in a context as complex as Russia because it is a 
relatively simple construct that is easy to measure. Scales of measurement for locus of control allow us to 
apply a widely used and well-tested construct to poorly understood phenomena. Effects of locus of 
control have been successfully replicated repeatedly across multiple fields, and a wide variety of scales of 
measurement have been developed and refined for use.  
Among scales of locus of control, there are two broad categories: general measures and subject-
specific measures. The latter includes health measures, age-specific measures, and parental measures, 
among others. One example of a subject-specific measure is Adrian Furnham’s Economic Locus of 
Control Scale, a seven point Likert-type scale is used to assess an individual’s belief in how much control 
they have over the work and money-related aspects of their lives. Questions ask to what extent 
respondents agree with statements like: “Becoming rich has little or nothing to do with chance” (Halpert 
& Hill, 2011). Unfortunately, there is not yet any widely used political-specific scale.  
The most widely used general scale is Rotter’s Internal-External locus of control scale, a 23-item 
forced-choice scale in which a person chooses between an internal or external interpretation (Jenning). 
Rotter’s scale is a general measure, not designed for specific domains, but rather to measure a person’s 
general orientation across all domains. Rotter believed that orientations could vary based on circumstance 
and that individuals could tend toward internality or externality as a personality trait; his scale reflects this 
belief and was designed to assess locus of control generally. A student of Rotter’s developed a second 
general measure, called the James Internal-External locus of control scale, which is also widely used. This 
measure uses a Likert-type scale in which participants rate how well a statement applies to their own 
thinking, using ratings ranging from 0 (strongly disagree) to 3 (strongly agree) (Halpert & Hill, 2011). 
A third commonly used measure is the Levenson IPC scale. This scale is one that distinguishes 
between multiple dimensions within the external orientation of locus of control. The Levenson IPC scale 
specifies whether externality is attributable to chaos/chance or to powerful others, such as political 
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leaders, parents or God. It also uses a Likert-type scale rather than forces choice, to place orientation on a 
spectrum rather than forced-choice. Levenson’s research (1972; 1973; 1974) and studies using his scale 
shows that distinguishing among external orientations has a significant effect on predictions of a wide 
variety of behaviors. In other words, this scale allows us to measure whether an individual attributes 
outcomes to a chance/luck or to a powerful authority. This could be useful for measuring political 
preferences, especially in the Russian context where a powerful authority has certainly influenced any 
sense of externality. 
In sum, locus of control provides an effective measure by which we can address important 
questions about behavior. It allows us to make predictions about whether or not individuals are likely to 
act on their environment. Applied to the context of support for authoritarianism in Russia, locus of control 
offers a theory of why Russians continue to support an illiberal regime and Putin’s stay in power. Locus 
of control allows us to question the role of internality versus externality in mediating one’s support for a 
particular form of governance via political action or inaction. In the case of Russia, should we expect to 
find more externality in locus of control? Given historical context and the development of a high 
tolerance for discomfort among Russians, can locus of control help explain why many continue to support 
a repressive government like Putin’s?  
Russia in Context 
 Russia is a particularly interesting case for locus of control study, given the paradoxical pairing of 
autocracy with protest and revolutions throughout its history. The last century in Russia has seen more 
turmoil and trauma than most of us can fathom. From the fall of the Russian empire during a time of war-
exhaustion, the takeover of the Bolsheviks, and the formulation of the Communist project to the 
devastation wreaked by the second World War, mass persecutions and abuses by Stalin, famine, the 
failure of the Communist project, and the chaos of the wild nineties – the Russian people have faced 
nearly every kind of trauma one can imagine in the last 100 years alone. I argue that the result has been 
the creation of a society marked by trauma and a people with an exceptionally high tolerance for their 
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environment – be it political, economic, or weather conditions. As far as modern memory extends, 
Russians, in general, have lived outside their comfort zone. Through years of historical experience of war, 
famine, political and economic turmoil, and harsh weather conditions, the Russian people have no doubt 
built up a high tolerance to environmental extremes. This in no way subtracts from the agency of the 
Russian people, but rather helps us better understand where Russians generally draw the line in terms of 
political action or protest. For the purpose of this study, it not necessary to understand every source of 
discomfort the Russian people have faced in the last several centuries, only to understand that Russian 
comfort with discomfort has been a gradual project. Deeply entrenched over time, a high tolerance for 
harsh conditions forms the cornerstone of the set of traits we might associate with Russian people. 
At the same time however, it is equally important to our understanding of the Russian people to 
acknowledge the democratic opening of Russian society at the collapse of the Soviet Union and the spirit 
of Russian protests. The very act of protesting a government runs contrary to what we should expect of an 
external locus of control. In the case of Russia, if citizens believe they do not control events in their lives, 
why would they ever take to the streets in mass protest against their government as we have seen them 
do? In this way, Russian protests and political activism are a paradox if we accept the idea that a Russian 
fatalism exists and is defined by excessive comfort with discomfort.  
Yet the democratic opening in the late eighties saw mass protests across the Soviet region, and 
mass protests more recently in Russia in 2011 and 2012 posed a significant challenge to the government. 
Moreover, mass protests continue to demonstrate that Russians are willing to take to the streets to 
challenge Putin’s government, even amid mass arrests. Pew Research data from 2012 show that a 
majority of Russians believe protests give people an opportunity to express their opinions, and they 
support protests in order for an election to be free and fair (Pew Research Center, 2012). The fact that 
Russians seem to value the act of protest poses a clear challenge to my theory of locus of control and 
expected effect of Russian fatalism. In this section, I address the political behavior and attitudes of many 
Russians today, which run counter to my hypotheses. 
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For the purpose of this study, I highlight the period from just before the Soviet Union collapsed 
until present because it is most relevant in terms of understanding the context in which the Russian people 
find themselves today. The drastic political and social changes that have occurred since the end of the 
Soviet Union are important for understanding the psychological and political preferences of Russians 
today amid the spirit of popular protests, even while Putin holds onto power with high favorability. First, 
however, it is worth noting the state of Russian society after generations of Soviet rule – in particular, 
how Russians generally thought about their relationship to the state at the time of collapse. 
 Especially during the height of Stalin’s rule but in the years after as well, the state was a central 
and ubiquitous presence (Fitzpatrick, 2000). The state was not only the puppet master of the economy and 
distributor of all goods, but it was also the primary source of employment for urban citizens. The state 
regulated nearly every aspect of life, sketching a glum picture of the inefficiency of bureaucracy and the 
ineffectiveness of law in the minds of Russians. Not only this, but it instilled in the general population a 
sense that all things were ultimately in hands of the regime and out of their control. In describing 
everyday life in the Stalinist era, one scholar describes it as follows: 
In the first place, [the state] was the formal distributor of goods and the near-
monopolistic producer of them, so that even the black market dealt largely in state 
products and relied heavily on state connections. In the second place, all urban citizens 
worked for the state, whether they were workers or typists or teachers or shop assistants: 
there were virtually no alternative employers. In the third place, the state was a tireless 
regulator of life, issuing and demanding an endless stream of documents and permits 
without which the simplest operations of daily life were impossible. The Soviet 
bureaucracy . . . full of inexperienced and unqualified officials, was slow, cumbersome, 
inefficient, and often corrupt. Law and legal process were held in low regard, and the 
actions of officialdom, from top to bottom, were marked by arbitrariness and favoritism. 
Citizens felt themselves at the mercy of officials and the regime; they speculated 
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endlessly about the people “up there” and what new surprises they might have in store for 
the population, but felt powerless to influence them (Fitzpatrick, 2000). 
Such pervasiveness of the state in the everyday lives of Russian citizens cannot be overstated, nor should 
the effect it had on the Russian people be underestimated. Although everyday life was influenced by 
many other factors, which changed a great deal in post-Stalin years, be it war, famine, or economic 
developments, the general structure and role of the party and state remained more or less fixed until 
Gorbachev’s leadership. If Soviet rule left Russians with an impression of what government meant, it 
would surely be arbitrary in rule of law, corrupt, and beyond their control.  
Riding on the coattails of an era of state saturation of everyday life, Gorbachev’s glasnost and 
perestroika policies eventually brought about the unexpected collapse of the Soviet Union and ushered in 
a period of disorganized corruption and organized crime. There are many convincing explanations of why 
the Soviet Union collapsed when and how it did, but what took its place in Russia was a similar 
centralized state that inherited many of its predecessor’s problems, yet one that confronted a democratic 
opening. On the one hand, widespread corruption and organized crime ran rampant during the wild 
nineties, creating at the social level a tumultuous place to live where rule of law was nearly obsolete and 
movement across social strata was a product of who one could bribe. On the other hand, even amid the 
political repression of the final years of Soviet rule, the late 1980s and early 1990s witnessed an 
unparalleled spread of democracy, winding down what Samuel Huntington calls the “third wave” of 
democratization. Political scientists pronounced these cases evidence of global “transition to democracy,” 
a process of democratization that had begun with Southern Europe in the 1970s before spreading to Latin 
America, Africa, and Asia by the late 1980s (Bunce, 1995). At the time, the enthusiasm with which the 
downfall of authoritarianism and tyranny was greeted made the triumph of democracy seem inevitable 
and irreversible. As one author writes: 
Who can forget the scene of Alexander Dubcek, the tragic hero of the 1968 Prague 
spring, returning to Prague in the fall of 1989 to the roar of the crowds in Wenceslas 
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Square? Or the utter triumph of the Solidarity movement in Poland's first competitive 
election of the postcommunist era, in which the ruling communist party lost practically 
every seat that was subject to legitimate competition? Or the crowds that flowed into the 
streets of Santiago, Chile, upon the news that General Pinochet had lost his plebiscite to 
extend his personal rule? (Seligson & Tucker, 2005). 
Likewise, in the Soviet space, mass protests across the Balkan states, in Armenia, and among 
Crimean Tatars in 1986 and 1987 set the stage for others to use the streets as a new political 
platform (Beissinger, 2010). As Mark Besseinger writes in the context of nationalist mobilization, 
“as challenging acts gained a momentum of their own, they grew increasingly autonomous from 
the constraints of institutions, even coming to transform the character of the institutions that once 
stifled them” (2010, p. 49). Significantly, Beissenger argues that not only do different movements 
influence each other, but that what people want is influenced and sculpted by these changing 
movements. According to his argument, why people protest is determined by their environment, 
which changes over time. Yet, not everyone participated in even the largest protests near the fall 
of the USSR or after. What motivates some to take to the streets and not others, and how can we 
best understand collective action in the post-Soviet space in terms of locus of control? 
 Protest threshold. Research on when mass discontent generates a popular uprising has 
mainly focused on popular uprisings of revolutionary magnitude, rather than inconsequential 
protests. However, some discussion of Timur Kuran’s work on protest threshold is relevant. In 
short, Kuran posits that individuals will protest when they reach their “revolutionary threshold” 
(1991). This occurs when the internal cost of preference falsification (believing one thing 
privately and supporting another publicly) grows higher than the cost of external payoff – that is, 
the risks of facing arrest or persecution for protesting versus the rewards of successful change or 
opposition victory. The external payoff changes with the size of public opposition – the more 
public opposition there is, the less risk there is associated with protesting. Thus, protests 
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commonly occur when the size of public opposition grows and lowers the cost of external payoff 
for individuals, or when the psychological cost of preference falsification grows to an extent that 
the individual would rather face the risk of external persecution than the cost of internal cognitive 
dissonance due to their own strong antigovernment sentiment. Thus, collective action culminates 
in protests when citizens reach a tipping point between internal payoff and external payoff. 
I accept Kuran’s theory that individuals protest as a result of strategic calculations – 
conscious or unconscious – of the internal and external costs of protesting. However, I argue that 
individuals also operate under some awareness of how much influence or effect their actions can 
have. To incorporate locus of control into Kuran’s framework, I conceptualize it as one 
component of the internal payoff. The more internal individuals’ locus of control is, the more 
control they perceive, and so the cost of remaining publicly silent becomes higher and the payoff 
of protesting grows. On the inverse, we should expect the opposite of individuals with a more 
external locus of control. Their belief that they exercise little control should lower their internal 
payoff and they should be less likely to protest because there is little incentive to do so. There is 
less cognitive dissonance and lower internal costs of remaining silent when one believes they 
have little control. All individuals hold some opinion about how much influence they wield as 
citizens, and collective actions theories should account for these beliefs when calculating when 
citizens will or will not protest. Taken in the context of Soviet control that preceded the 
democratic opening of Russia, we should recall the general sense that the Soviet bureaucracy was 
beyond their control. If that view of government remains among Russians today, we should 
expect to find more externality in locus of control and a higher protest threshold. 
In sum, mass protests have been a somewhat regular occurrence over the last thirty years 
in Russia, usually centering on economic demands and more recently on anti-corruption. A first 
round of mass protests took place in the late 80s and early 90s at the fall of the Soviet Union. A 
second round occurred in the late 90s over economic problems, and a third began in 2007 over 
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environmental concerns, anti-Putin, and anti-corruption demands, culminating in the 2010-2011 
protests that rocked Moscow with calls for a Russia without Putin (Elder, 2011). Mass protests 
and arrests continued throughout 2017, from anti-corruption protests after revelations of Dmitry 
Medvedev’s embezzling schemes in the spring, to election protests in the fall (Bennetts, 2017). 
Even as they remain a regular occurrence, Putin continues to hold on to power and, at the time of 
this writing, has just won an easy reelection for another 6-year term in office with more than 76% 
of the vote (“Russia Election”, 2018). On the one hand, mass protests clearly challenge the idea 
of a Russian fatalism. On the other hand, continued majority support for Putin and contentment 
with the current government stands in contrast to fringe protests. Russian approval of Putin 
continues to hover at a high of about 80% approval (Carroll, 2017).  
To be sure, mass protests exemplify an important element of Russian society, but they do 
not yet represent public majority opinion. Overall, Russians continue to prefer strong hand 
authoritarian rule by Putin to any more-democratic alternative (Carroll, 2017). Even as the 
Russian people bear the brunt of economic consequences from sanctions because of Putin’s 
decisions, the majority of citizens continue to be comfortable with such discomfort. To what 
extent are they external in their locus of control, believing they have little influence beyond 
expressing opinions into a void, and how might this be influencing their beliefs about Putin’s 
regime? Would changing Russian beliefs about how much control they exercise, change their 
political attitudes? 
A Note on Authoritarianism 
Autocracy in its many forms is nothing new, but the form it commonly takes today as 
authoritarian government warrants mentioning before I provide an analysis of its relationship to locus of 
control. This study sees authoritarian regimes not as something solely imposed from the top-down as a 
result of the state and leadership cooptation, but rather sees it in terms of the “’co-construction’ of 
autocratic power” (Greene & Robertson, 2017). Leadership certainly plays a role in the construction and 
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maintenance of the power dynamic, but endogenous factors also work from the bottom up to reinforce 
authoritarian power once in place. It is thus imperative to understand what shapes and reinforces support 
for authoritarian governance at the psychological and individual level. Here I clarify what I mean by 
authoritarianism and authoritarian personality and discuss the relationship between the two.  
I define authoritarianism as a form of government characterized by a strong centralized power 
and limited political freedoms. Authoritarian governance is marked by limited individual freedoms and 
unchecked power of the state. Looking to the influential work of Juan Linz on regime-type criteria, 
political systems may be categorized according to varying levels of political pluralism, their basis for 
legitimacy, social mobilization, and how the well-defined the executive power is (2000). Authoritarian 
regimes are lacking in political pluralism, their basis or legitimacy is emotion-based (especially in fear of 
an alternative), they have minimal social mobilization, and a poorly defined executive power. Specific 
features of authoritarianism are well known, such as fraudulent elections or anti-immigrant and anti-
minority sentiments, which continue to bring authoritarianism to the forefront of headlines and 
discussion. Authoritarianism as a regime-type is not to be confused with authoritarian personality, 
although they are related in that individuals with authoritarian personalities are more likely to prefer 
authoritarian governance (Stenner, 2005). 
With respect to authoritarian personality, I define it here simply as a tendency to submit to 
authority (Altemeyer, 1981). However, the “authoritarian personality” has its roots in the theoretical 1950 
work of Adorno et al., which describes a potentially fascistic personality type, an individual who is 
susceptible to anti-Semitic ideology and anti-democratic political beliefs due to intrapsychic conflicts that 
result in insecurities. Adorno and colleagues viewed the authoritarian personality as marked by personal 
insecurities, resulting in adherence to authority. In more recent theoretical work, Bob Altemeyer has done 
extensive work on what he calls right-wing authoritarianism (1998). He describes this personality type as 
a set of three tendencies as noted in attitudinal clusters: submission to legitimate authorities; aggression 
towards sanctioned targeted minority groups; and adherence to values and beliefs perceived as sanctioned 
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by authorities. While there has been plenty of theoretical work on authoritarian personality, the concept 
itself is not a simple or agreed-upon one. There remains no consensus on whether authoritarianism is a 
personality, an attitude, or an ideology (Schuman et al., 1992). In this study, I view authoritarian 
personality more as an ideology, as a way of viewing the world.  
In order to understand what an authoritarian worldview means, I turn to the work of Hetherington 
and Weiler, who employ a useful definition of authoritarianism as a worldview motivated by a need for 
order at its center (2009).  This approach focuses on the effects of authoritarianism rather than the concept 
itself. In their emphasis of a need for order, the authors do not dismiss the distinctive role that authority 
plays. I accept their conceptualization of authoritarianism which emphasizes a strong desire for order, but 
I add that the inverse is actually more useful for understanding the effects of authoritarianism. That is, a 
fear of instability and disorder rather than a desire for order motivates individuals scoring high in 
authoritarianism. Certain authoritarian behaviors seem irrational - voting against one’s economic 
interests, supporting less freedom of the media and fewer human rights protections, to name a few – in 
terms of sacrificing one’s self-interest for fear it could be worse. Understanding authoritarian behavior as 
marked not by desire for order but rather by fear of disorder allows us to better understand seemingly 
irrational behaviors in support of authoritarian governance.  
Moreover, this conception of what drives authoritarianism allows us to understand why 
individuals may tolerate something which to others might seem intolerable. While fear of disorder may be 
the primary driving force behind authoritarianism, political attitudes remain a product of a host of other 
psychological factors beyond fear or desire for order. Several studies have already examined this 
relationship between psychological factors and support for authoritarian governance. One such study 
looks at the Big 5 personality traits and finds that ‘agreeableness’, a personality trait associated with a 
desire to maintain positive relations with others that is usually peripheral to politics, is the most important 
and consistent trait in predicting authoritarian support (Greene & Robertson, 2016). Given the linkage 
between authoritarian personality and support for authoritarian governance, a better understanding of the 
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features of an authoritarian personality helps us better understand when and why individuals support 
authoritarian governance. The question of how locus of control relates to and predicts authoritarian 
personality and support for authoritarian regimes is especially interesting.   
Introduction to Data Analysis 
What emerges from different fields of research and seemingly disparate subjects is that locus of 
control and authoritarianism seem to be quite intertwined. Beliefs about how much control one exercises 
over outcomes has a direct application to political beliefs and support for or opposition to authoritarian 
governance. In the case of Russia, if a set of traits that underlie the Russian fatalism stereotype do exist, I 
posit that we can measure it by conceptualizing it as an external locus of control. Moreover, I suggest that 
locus of control correlates with greater support for authoritarian governance, that authoritarian preference 
can be predicted based on whether one has an external or internal locus of control. To test my hypotheses, 
I use a dataset from Pew Research Center’s 2011 Spring Nations survey. I use the same dataset to control 
for country and explore whether there is initial evidence to support my second hypothesis that Russians 
tend to have more external orientations on locus of control measures than do citizens of other countries. I 
also introduce a second control variable to test weather there is a relationship between authoritarian 
preference and preference for economic strength, as I suspect these two are closely related.  
Data Analysis 
In order to test both of these hypotheses, I use the 2011 Spring Global Attitudes Survey 
dataset from Pew Research Center, which collected responses on a range of issues from 
respondents in twenty-four different countries across the globe. Survey results are based on 
telephone and face-to-face interviews conducted under the direction of Princeton Survey 
Research Associates International. 
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Measurement. I use survey question 57 (variable name “Q57”, which I refer to hereafter 
as “Authoritarianism”) as the dependent variable and survey question 60 (variable name “Q60”, 
which I refer to hereafter as L.O.C. for locus of control) as the independent variable. Because I 
am interested in what influences authoritarian preference, the dependent variable is used as a 
measure of authoritarian preference and measures survey responses from Lithuania, Ukraine, 
Russia, and all Muslim countries to the following question: “Some feel that we should rely on a 
Democratic form of government to solve our country's problems. Others feel that we should rely 
on a leader with a strong hand to solve our country's problems. Which comes closer to your 
opinion?” Response options included: 1) Democratic form of government; 2) Strong-handed 
leader; 8) Don’t know; or 9) Refused. Using STATA, I recoded the dependent variable to count 8 
and 9 as missing values and change 1 (democratic government) to 0 and 2 (strong leader) to 1. I 
use this variable as a measure of authoritarian preference, as it asks respondents to prioritize 
either democracy or a leader with a strong-hand.  
The independent variable (L.O.C.) measures external locus of control. It asks respondents 
from all countries except Egypt and Japan1 the following question: “Thinking about people in 
our country who do not have a job, in general would you say this is mostly their own fault or is it 
mostly because of forces outside their control?” Responses included: 1) Mostly their own fault; 
2) Mostly because of forces outside their control; 8) Don’t know; or 9) Refused. Using STATA, I 
recoded the independent variable to count 8 and 9 as missing values and change 1 (own fault) to 
0 and 2 (outside forces) to 1. I use this question as a measure of locus of control because it is 
typically included on measurement scales of locus of control, such as the I-E scale. For example, 
                                                          
1 Countries included or excluded from the data analysis were not an intentional choice on my part, but were based 
on what was available in the data.  
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on the Rotter I-E scale of locus of control, one survey item asks respondents to choose between: 
“Becoming a success is a matter of hard work, luck has little or nothing to do with it” and 
“Getting a good job depends mainly on being in the right place at the right time” (Jenning). Both 
questions address causes of having or not having a job, and ask respondents to choose between 
internal causes and external causes. 
Next, I introduce two control variables, one controlling for country (variable name 
“COUNTRY”), and one measuring whether respondents more highly value economic strength or 
good democracy (variable name “Q58”, which I hereafter refer to as “Economy”). The variable 
COUNTRY simply accounts for where respondents are from. For the purpose of this analysis, I 
recoded the COUNTRY variable (with the new variable name “COUNTRY_RUS”) so that all 
countries other than Russia are coded 0 and Russia is coded 1. I use this variable to test whether 
the effect of locus of control is stronger in Russia than for other countries, and thus whether the 
Russian fatalism hypothesis has merit.  
As for the second control variable (Economy), it asks respondents from Lithuania, 
Ukraine, Russia, and all Muslim countries2: “If you had to choose between a good democracy or 
a strong economy, which would you say is more important?” Response options included: 1) good 
democracy; 2) A strong economy; 8) Don’t know; or 9) Refused. I recoded this variable as 
“Q58_dum” to count 8 and 9 as missing values and change 1 (good democracy) to 0 and 2 
(strong economy) to 1. I use this question to test whether the relationship between L.O.C. and 
Authoritarianism is affected by preference for a strong economy, given the context of economic 
instability that has plagued Russia in recent history. In the context of Russia, it is likely that this 
                                                          
2 Countries included or excluded from the data analysis were not an intentional choice on my part, but were based 
on what was available in the data. 
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variable is taps into opinions of the 1990s and 2000s and the economic instability that 
characterized this time.  
Descriptive Statistics. Cross-tabulations for the dependent variable (Authoritarianism) 
with each of the independent variables (L.O.C, COUNTRY_RUS, and Economy) are provided in 
the Appendix (see Table 1.1, Table 1.2, and Table 1.3, respectively). Frequencies are given over 
percentages. See Figure 1.1 and Figure 1.2 in the Appendix for bar charts of the relationship 
between the independent variable and dependent variable, controlling for country and for 
economic strength preference. The pattern of the relationship between each set of variables is 
additive, with differences of similar tendency and magnitude across values of the control 
variable. 
Inferential Statistics. Below is a correlation matrix of the independent-dependent 
variable relationship controlling for each of the control variables, attained using STATA. The 
first is the correlation matrix with COUNTRY_RUS as the control variable. 
 
Next is the correlation matrix for with Economy as the control variable: 
 
As shown, the correlation coefficient for the independent variable, L.O.C., and the dependent 
variable is nearly the same in both analyses at .0809 and .0818 and runs in a positive direction. 
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That is, as locus of control becomes more external, preference for a strong leader increases. The 
relationship between COUNTRY_RUS and the dependent variable is .0935 and is also positive – 
that is, when the country is Russia, respondents express greater preference for a strong leader 
than for democracy. For the Economy control variable, the correlation coefficient is positive for 
both the dependent variable and the independent variable, with the highest coefficient being 
between the Economy control variable and the dependent variable at .3437. Preference for a 
strong economy most strongly correlates with preference for a strong leader. It is also worth 
noting the correlation between the Economy variable and L.O.C. variable is positive .0482, 
showing they are only slightly less correlated than the L.O.C. variable and Country.  
Regression. Using STATA, I attained linear regression models for the relationship 
between L.O.C. and the dependent variable, Authoritarianism (Model 1), the relationship 
between L.O.C., Authoritarianism, and COUNTRY_RUS (Model 2), the relationship between 
LO.C., Authoritarianism, and Economy (Model 3), and the relationship between L.O.C., 
Authoritarianism, COUNTRY_RUS, and Economy (Model 4). See Table 1.4 in the Appendix for 
a table of regression models. For each of these models, there is a significant relationship between 
each of the variables and the dependent variable. Model 4 is the best fit model because its R2 
value tells us this model explains 12.69% of the variance in the dependent variable and includes 
every variable with a significant effect. It is clear from this statistical evidence that Economy 
explains the most variance in Authoritarianism. For a table with the logistical regression for 
Model 4, see Table 1.5 in the Appendix. The results of logistic regression produces a Pseudo R2 
value of .0951, which tells us that this model predicts .0951 of the variance in the dependent 
variable. Coefficients in the logistic regression are all positive and significant and do not 
challenge the results of the linear regression.  
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Results. I can safely reject the null hypothesis that locus of control, L.O.C., and 
COUNTRY_RUS explain 0 variance in the dependent variable. Both of these variables do in fact 
define a small but statistically significant effect on authoritarian preference, as measured by 
Authoritarianism. Individuals who are more likely to explain joblessness as outside of one’s 
control are more likely to prefer “strong hand” governance. For both control variables, there is an 
additive relationship, with the stronger relationship being between preference for economic 
strength, Economy, and the independent and dependent variables. P-values being equal to 0.000 
across all analysis shows clear statistical significance in the results. Those who prefer a strong 
economy also tend to prefer a strong hand leader and explain joblessness as due to outside 
forces. Likewise, those who prefer good democracy also tend to prefer democratic governance to 
a strong hand leader and to explain joblessness as due to one’s own fault. Based on this analysis, 
it seems authoritarian preference can be predicted by measures of locus of control, and thus my 
first hypothesis is supported. Referring to Figure 1.1, it is clear that respondents from Russia tend 
to have higher scores on the measure of external locus of control, and thus the results also 
support my second hypothesis. The relationship is weak, but it is statistically significant.  
Discussion 
My strongest finding is the relationship between preference for economic strength over 
democracy and preference for authoritarian government. This finding is not surprising, given the 
way both the Authoritarianism question and the Economy question ask respondents to choose 
either democracy or an alternative (either strong hand leader or a strong economy). It is also not 
surprising that Russia positively correlates with preference for strong economy over democracy, 
given the historical context discussed previously. Considering the economic turmoil Russia 
experienced in the 1990s and has only gradually (and quite shakily) recovered from during 
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Putin’s tenure, the fact that Russians, in general, would reject democracy in favor of economic 
well-being is not surprising. I also suspect that rather than simply measuring democratic 
preference again, this variable sees a greater effect in Russia due to opinions of the 1990s and 
2000s and the economic instability that characterized this time period.   
What is more interesting is the relationship of locus of control to both authoritarian 
preference and to country. Locus of control does have a significant effect in the direction 
predicted, lending support for the argument I make in this paper that measures of locus of control 
can provide important predictors of authoritarian support. It also lends support to the proposition 
that Russians, in general, may be more likely than citizens of Western democracies to have an 
external locus of control. In the context of recent Russian history, some Russians are more 
inclined to choose good economics over democracy than are others, and locus of control helps to 
explain these individual differences. Whether one has an internal or external locus of control 
explains why some people support authoritarian leadership while others do not. While the data 
lend support to the my theories discussed here, there are plenty of limitations worth noting.  
Conclusion, Limitations & Future Research 
Firstly, it is worth revisiting the concept of Russian fatalism within the context of the 
results of this study. Just as any culture consists of unique individuals with a host of individual 
differences, Russia is no exception to this rule. No generalization can accurately be made which 
applies to every person within a population. The data show that survey respondents from Russia 
tend to explain joblessness as due to external causes, more so than respondents from other 
countries. This does not necessarily mean Russian fatalism exists as a measurable concept that is 
unique to Russia. It is very likely that if I had controlled for Ukraine or Lithuania instead of 
Russia, that I might also have found people there tend to explain joblessness as due to external 
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factors. On the other hand, I would expect dramatically different results if I asked this question in 
the United States, where right-wing authoritarians are known to place blame for joblessness 
squarely on the backs of jobless individuals. Moreover, cultural differences are much more 
complex than any one construct.  
If this study concludes anything about the stereotype of Russian fatalism, it is that such a 
broad, clichéd construct is not useful for understanding the nuances of personality traits across 
individuals, much less across large swaths of the globe. By breaking down such a construct into a 
set of traits, one of which we can measure as locus of control, we can better address the role 
these traits play in motivating and shaping individual behavior. Understanding individual 
behaviors in terms of a set of specific, measurable traits then allows us theorize about patterns of 
social and political behavior in meaningful ways. 
Turning to methodological weaknesses, the present dataset is admittedly not ideal for 
testing theories of this scope, as it falls short both in breadth and in depth. In terms of depth, the 
way the Authoritarianism and Economy survey questions are worded forces a choice between 
two things that are not actually mutually exclusive. Why can a country not have both a good 
democracy and a leader with a strong hand? Does having a strong-handed leader necessarily 
speak to the degree of democracy in a given system? Similarly, why can there not be a good 
democracy and a strong economy? By framing the questions in a way that these items seem 
mutually exclusive, the survey may actually be aligning “good democracy” as an opposite to 
“economic strength” or a “strong leader” and thus producing response bias.  
 In terms of breadth, the present data are limited by having only one question that broadly 
assesses the two complex variables I am most interested in: authoritarian preference and locus of 
control. An ideal method would survey respondents from various countries using a verified locus 
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of control scale and measure of authoritarianism to collect nuanced responses from collectivist 
and individualist cultures and from Western liberal democracies and hybrid regimes like Russia. 
The present data also lack measures of socioeconomic status. Such factors could very well 
explain the relationship we see between variables. For example, people who report that 
democracy is more important than economic well-being might already be economically better off 
than those who say a strong economy is more important. Other factors like age might also 
explain why some citizens prefer democracy and others do not and even why some respondents 
are more internal or external in locus of control. If such socioeconomic factors were introduced 
into this model and locus of control remained significant, it would constitute a stronger finding in 
favor of locus of control.   
A good next step to further test whether there is a causal relationship between locus of 
control and authoritarianism, would be use a random sample of Americans or citizens of other 
Western democracies and a group of Russians and conduct a survey within each group that 
measures both locus of control and authoritarian preference, controlling for socioeconomic 
factors. Doing so might begin to address the question: to what extent does external or internal 
locus of control behave differently in different settings? We know from past research that higher 
socioeconomic status correlates to more internal orientations of locus of control (Cohen et al., 
2001), and so including such factors are likely to alter the results. Adding age as a factor might 
address the question, to what extent do historical experience and memory influence how 
individuals view control? For future research, one might consider surveying Russians who 
participate in popular protests and those who do not and assessing the same locus of control, 
authoritarian, and socioeconomic variables among them.  
26 
 
In sum, despite obvious limitations in this study, based on the literature and my data 
analysis, there is reason to believe a relationship exists between locus of control and preference 
for authoritarianism. Individuals with an external locus of control are more likely to prefer 
authoritarianism. Respondents from Russia were more likely to be external in their locus of 
control and to prefer authoritarianism and a strong economy. The strongest relationship found is 
that between preference for economic strength and preference for a leader with a strong hand. 
Future research should explore these relationships more fully in order to gain a better 
understanding of psychological factors motivating political preference for authoritarian 
leadership in places like Russia. Future research might also aim to expand the literature by 
formulating a theory of protest threshold that accounts for locus of control.  
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APPENDIX 
Table 1.1 
Cross-Tabulation for the locus of control (independent variable) and the authoritarian preference 
(dependent variable): 
 
Table 1.2 
Cross-Tabulation for country (control variable) and the authoritarian preference (dependent 
variable): 
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Table 1.3 
Cross-Tabulation for economic strength (control variable) and the authoritarian preference 
(dependent variable): 
 
Table 1.4 
Table 1.4. Regression of authoritarian preference (Q57) on selected independent variables. 
Coefficient Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Constant .42735 .40793 .21222 .20268 
Q60 L.o.C. .09067 .09607 .07319 .07714 
 t-value 7.47 7.95 6.40 6.76 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Country_Rus - .16949 - .11733 
t-value - 9.74 - 7.02 
p-value - 0.000 - 0.000 
Q58 Economy - - .35569 .34961 
t-value - - 33.65 32.85 
p-value - - 0.000 0.000 
R2 0.0065 0.0161 0.1224 .1269 
Source: 2011 Global Attitudes Spring Survey, Pew Research Center 
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Table 1.5 
 
Figure 1.1 
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Figure 1.2 
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